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The British Importation of American
Corporate Compliance
INTRODUCTION
Legislators and prosecutors in Britain are reevaluating
laws and procedures concerning corporate crime. In an effort to
modernize and strengthen corporate criminal laws, British
policymakers are examining and, in some instances,
“importing” corporate criminal laws and procedures from the
United States. This exchange of legal theories is rooted in
comparative law, which allows attorneys, legislators, and
scholars to understand and learn from legal systems in foreign
jurisdictions.1 As in this instance, policymakers may be so
influenced by a foreign legal system that they decide to
incorporate a version of the foreign system into their domestic
legal structure.2
The director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the
British counterpart to the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ),3 has publicly advocated changing both the substantive

1

The practice of comparing substantive laws and legal procedures is “at once
very old and very modern.” Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law 1162 (Max Planck
Inst. for Private Law & ECGI, Working Paper No. 77/2006, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980981. Comparative company law is “old” because “ever since
companies and company laws first existed, trade has not stopped at the frontiers of
countries and states.” Id. Academic treatment of comparative law in the corporate
context, however, is a fairly recent development that was driven by “the spread of 1930s
American securities regulation into Europe, the company law harmonization efforts of the
European Community . . . [and] the rise of the corporate governance movement.” Id. at
1162-63. The corporate governance “international bandwagon” started in the United
States and the United Kingdom, traveled over to Continental Europe and Japan, and has
since “permeated practically all industrialized countries.” Id. at 1163.
2
See id. at 1167 (“Comparative law has always been considered to be an
enrichment of the stock of legal solutions . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3
The SFO has “jurisdiction in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, but
not in Scotland, the Isle of Man, or the Channel Islands.” Who We Are, SERIOUS FRAUD
OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
For purposes of this note, I use “Great Britain” and “United Kingdom” and variations
thereof to describe the territories over which the SFO has jurisdiction, recognizing that
SFO jurisdiction does not correspond directly to the political or geographical territories
designated by these terms. The United Kingdom, as a sovereign state, is comprised of
the constituent countries and political entities of England, Scotland, Wales, and
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corporate criminal laws and the procedural mechanisms in
Great Britain to better combat corporate crime.4 In order to
change the substantive law, the director has suggested
lowering the required mens rea5 for corporate criminal
liability.6 Although this change has not yet been implemented
by Parliament, the SFO has made changes to its legal
procedures by developing and using what I refer to herein as
“Compliance Agreements” when dealing with corporate
wrongdoers. These Compliance Agreements bear a strong
resemblance to American Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements.7 However, the SFO is using these Compliance
Agreements in conjunction with civil, rather than criminal,
laws in an effort to fight corporate crime.8
Legislators in Britain are examining substantive laws
and procedures in the United States for a variety of reasons,
including the success that the United States government—
specifically the United States Attorney’s Office for the
Southern District of New York (SDNY)9—has had in
prosecuting corporations for their crimes. Moreover, the United
Kingdom and the United States both have “strong judiciaries,
low levels of government corruption, and highly developed
stock markets,” which facilitate the comparison and exchange
of laws and legal procedures.10 Both jurisdictions also use the
same general legal framework for corporate criminal
culpability, and provide largely similar due process rights to
Northern Ireland. Great Britain, as a territory, refers to England, Scotland, and Wales,
but excludes Northern Ireland.
4
Vivian Robinson, Gen. Counsel, Serious Fraud Office, Speech: International
Co-operation in the Investigation of Serious Fraud and Corruption (Aug. 13, 2009),
available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/other-speeches/speeches-2009.aspx
(follow “International Co-operation in the investigation” hyperlink).
5
Mens rea is “an element of criminal responsibility; . . . a criminal intent.
Guilty knowledge and willfulness.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).
6
Robinson, supra note 4.
7
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements are essentially contracts
whereby the government agrees to defer or to cease prosecuting a corporation that has
engaged in some unlawful conduct in return for the corporation’s admission of
wrongdoing and pledge to institute remedial reforms. See infra Part III.
8
Id.
9
The SDNY represents the interests of the United States government in a
variety of matters. It has jurisdiction in New York County and seven other counties.
The director, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, reports
to the United States Attorney General. For an overview of the DOJ and its agencies,
see Department of Justice Agencies, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.
justice.gov/agencies/index-org.html.
10
John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical
Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
687, 689 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
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defendants.11 Further, the prosecuting offices frequently work
together
or
in
parallel
investigations
to
resolve
multijurisdictional cases, especially those concerning foreign
bribery and corruption.12
While British policymakers have looked to the United
States for guidance in combating corporate crime, this note
argues that American policymakers should similarly learn from
the developments in Britain. The SFO is currently adopting a
procedure that has been widely criticized since its inception in
the United States.13 The SFO should familiarize itself with the
criticisms of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, as
they predict many of the likely problems that the SFO will face
in adding Compliance Agreements to its procedural toolkit. The
SFO should also anticipate unique problems that might arise
from incorporating into a civil system a procedure that was
designed for use in the criminal context.
Despite importing such a controversial procedure, the
SFO has been successful in at least two instances in achieving
corporate reform through the use of Compliance Agreements.
These successes emphasize the drawbacks of the American
corporate criminal system as a whole and demonstrate that
civil laws and procedures may, in fact, achieve corporate reform
without fostering adversarial relationships between the
government and corporate entities. American policymakers
11

JESSICA DE GRAZIA, REVIEW OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE 2 (2008),
available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/34318/de%20grazia%20review%20of%20sfo.pdf.
12
See Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: The SFO and
DOJ ‘Special Relationship’: The Future of UK/US Co-operation against Overseas
Corruption and Other Crimes (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/aboutus/our-views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “The SFO and DOJ ‘Special
Relationship’” hyperlink) (discussing the interaction between the SFO and the DOJ in
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases, relating the SFO’s progress concerning
“global settlements,” and discussing extradition policies of the United States and
United Kingdom). One recent example of a parallel investigation by the SFO and the
SDNY is the Allied Deals cases. DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 37. The conspiracies
charged in these cases involved two brothers, one in New York City and the other in
London, who operated a Ponzi scheme by which bank loans were laundered through
Allied Deals, Inc., and an international network of companies that were purportedly
engaged in metal trading. United States v. Chu, 183 F. App’x 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2006). See
infra Part III for a full discussion of the foreign bribery statutes in the United Kingdom
and the United States; see also infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text (discussing
the parallel investigation and global settlement in R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc.
(EWCC) 7 (Eng.)).
13
The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th
Cong. § 4 (2009), which was introduced in Congress for consideration by the House
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law,
illustrates many of the criticisms of the use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements.
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should examine the developments in Great Britain and
consider making changes to corporate criminal laws and
procedures in light of the SFO’s achievements.
Part I of this note examines the development of
corporate criminal laws in the United States and Britain. Part
II describes how policymakers at the SFO have suggested
changes in substantive British laws to mimic corporate
criminal laws in the United States. Part III compares corporate
reform under Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements to
corporate reform under British Compliance Agreements. Part
IV describes the likely problems the SFO faces by importing a
procedure that was designed for use in criminal prosecutions.
Finally, Part V describes some of the successes of British
Compliance Agreements, and uses the developments in the
United Kingdom as a basis to suggest changes in corporate
criminal procedures and substantive laws in the United States.
I.

THE HISTORY AND COMPARISON OF SUBSTANTIVE
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
GREAT BRITAIN

Until the early 1900s, American corporate criminal law14
closely followed English common law doctrine, which did not
provide a basis for imputing liability to a corporation based on
the actions of employees. However, an American case in the
early 1900s established a distinctive theory of corporate
criminal liability. While English law has since evolved, the two
legal systems retain differences in the scope of liability for
corporate entities. However, in the last several years,
Parliament has passed new legislation broadening the scope of
liability for corporations in some specific instances, thereby
mimicking the theory of liability in the United States and
reversing the flow of influence.
It is well established that, in the United States today,
an organization15 may be held vicariously liable for the crimes
that its employees commit within the scope of their
employment. Until 1909, American courts declined to hold

14

This note focuses on federal laws and federal crimes. State laws may differ.
An “organization” is “a person other than an individual.” 18 U.S.C. § 18
n.1. The term includes “corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies,
unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments and political
subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations.” Id.
15
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organizations liable for the acts of individuals.16 Then, in New
York Central Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, the
Supreme Court upheld a statute subjecting a corporate entity
to criminal liability.17 The Court explained the theory behind
vicarious liability for corporations for intent-based crimes,
stating that a “corporation is held responsible for acts not
within the agent’s corporate powers strictly construed, but
which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation
when employing the corporate powers actually authorized.”18
The Court imputed liability, citing public policy concerns and
reasoning that “[s]ince a corporation acts by its officers and
agents, their purposes, motives, and intent are just as much
those of the corporation as are the things done.”19
The New York Central decision “upheld a statute that
expressly punished corporations. It did not suggest that
statutes silent on the subject should be read to [impute liability
to businesses].”20 Rather, the Court noted that “there are some
crimes, which in their nature cannot be committed by
corporations.”21 After this decision, however, the Supreme Court
and other courts in the United States routinely read criminal
statutes to impose liability on corporations under a theory of
respondeat superior.22
Current federal law applies an expansive interpretation
of this theory, holding that an organization can be convicted of
nearly any crime committed by an employee, provided that he
or she was acting within the scope of his or her authority and
acted “with the intention to help the company, even if the

16

N.Y. Central Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94

(1909).
17

Id.
Id.
19
Id. at 492-93 (citations omitted).
20
Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (2009).
21
N.Y. Central, 212 U.S. at 494.
22
Alschuler, supra note 20, at 1363. Respondeat superior is the principle that
authorizes corporate punishment whenever “an agent or other person acting for or
employed by the corporation acting within the scope of employment violate[s] a
statute’s prohibitions.” Id. at 1364. Some states in America, by contrast, have limited
the standard of liability to cases in which “the commission of the offense was
authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of
directors or by a high managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation within the
scope of his office or employment.” Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962)).
18
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employee was violating express directions or corporate
policies.”23 A corporation can be held criminally liable if:
the criminal conduct is undertaken without the knowledge of top
management; the criminal activity was performed by a low-level
employee; the primary purpose was to benefit only the miscreant
employee; there was no actual benefit to the corporation; the
criminal acts were performed in direct violation of instructions from
the company; . . . no single individual had the requisite intent or
knowledge sufficient to violate the law; it is never possible to identify
the actual employee or agent responsible for the crime; or the
offending employees are all acquitted of the same offense.24

This exposes corporations to liability for a vast array of federal
crimes.25 In fact, the scope of the modern rule is so expansive
that “a single errant employee can cause the downfall of a
multinational corporation and the loss of thousands of jobs.”26
Unlike American courts that apply an expansive theory
of corporate criminal liability, British courts are hesitant to
impose liability on business organizations for the acts of
employees. As early as the seventeenth century, English courts
held that a corporation could not be indicted for wrongful acts,
or misfeasance,27 because it exists “not as a natural person, but
23

Robert J. Ridge & Mackenzie A. Baird, The Pendulum Swings Back:
Revisiting Corporate Criminality and the Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements,
33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 187, 189 (2008). The requirement that employees must be acting
within the scope of their employment “has been interpreted so expansively that it is
practically invisible in many contexts.” Andrew Weissmann & David Newman,
Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L. J. 411, 422 (2007) (adding that the
scope of employment is the agent’s “actual or apparent authority” (emphasis added)).
The requirement that the employee intended to help the corporation has also been
expanded “because courts recognize that many employees act primarily for their own
personal gain.” Id. (quoting Kendel Drew & Kyle A. Clark, Corporate Criminal
Liability, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 282 (2005)). An agent does not have to be acting
with the sole motivation to assist the corporation, and organizations have been held
liable for acts of agents “no matter what their place in the corporate hierarchy.” Id. at
423; see also id. at 423 n.37 (“Corporate criminal liability has been predicated on the
actions of low-level employees, including salespeople, manual laborers, truck drivers,
and clerical workers.”).
24
Ridge & Baird, supra note 23, at 189 (quoting Preet Bharara, Corporations
Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on
Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 64-65 (2007)).
25
“Examples of the unlawful activity of [American] corporations range from
routine ‘union busting,’ violations of environmental regulations, and price-fixing, to
illegal foreign payments, smuggling, and fraud of various kinds.” Kent Greenfield,
Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How
Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 128788 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
26
Alschuler, supra note 20, at 1364.
27
“Misfeasance” is an “improper performance of some act which a person may
lawfully do.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1000.
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as an artificial entity.”28 Courts reasoned that a corporate entity
“lacked physical, mental, and moral capacity to engage in
wrongful conduct, or to suffer punishment. It could neither
commit criminal acts, entertain criminal intent, nor suffer
imprisonment,” and therefore could not be subject to liability.29
During this time however, a variety of cases demonstrated that
a corporation could be held “liable on a presentment of
nonfeasance.”30
In 1846, in the leading case of The Queen v. Great North
England Railway,31 the court recognized that a corporation
could also be liable for misfeasance and “imposed corporate
criminal liability for the misconduct of employees acting within
the scope of employment” by “borrowing a theory of vicarious
liability from tort law.”32 Despite recognizing that liability could
attach to corporations for the acts of their employees, English
courts resisted a broad interpretation of the “corporation-asperson metaphor” and continued to hold corporations liable
only where statutes provided strict liability, since corporate
entities could not manifest the required mens rea for crimes
that had a “moral dimension.”33
Today, British courts will hold entities liable where an
offense makes an express provision for corporate liability, as
the United States Supreme Court reasoned in New York
Central.34 Where no express statutory provision exists, however,
British law provides that a corporation will have imputed to it
the acts and state of mind of “those who represent the
[company’s] directing mind and will.”35 Whether the court will
28

Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History
and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 393, 396 (1982).
29
Id.
30
Id. at 401 (citing Case of Langforth Bridge, (1635) 79 Eng. Rep. 919 (K.B.)).
“Nonfeasance” is “the omission of an act which a person ought to do.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1000.
31
(1846) 115 Eng. Rep. 1294 (Q.B.).
32
Brickey, supra note 28, at 402-03 (footnotes omitted).
33
Weissmann & Newman, supra note 23, at 419.
34
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS 2-4,
available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/65228/com1%20joint%20guidance%20on%20
corporate%20prosecutions%20for%20publication.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
35
Id. at 4 (citing Lennards Carrying Co. & Asiatic Petroleum, [1915] A.C. 705
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Andrews Weatherfoil, [1972] 56 Crim. App. 31
(A.C.) (Eng.); Bolton Eng’g Co. v. Graham, [1957] 1 Q.B. 159 (Eng.)). “Directing mind
and will” is restricted to “the Board of Directors, the Managing Director, and perhaps
other superior officers who carry out functions of management and speak and act as
the company.” Id. (quoting Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.)).
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attribute acts of a natural person to the entity will be
determined by evaluating the constitution of the company
concerned (including articles of association, minutes of the
general meetings, and various memoranda) and definitions in
the applicable statute.36
Although British law provides for vicarious liability, it
rarely arises in trial because proving a corporation’s state of
mind such that liability could be imputed is “notoriously
difficult.”37 Because British law requires the prosecution to
“identify an individual as the directing mind and will of the
company in respect of the relevant activity” in order to
attribute that individual’s state of mind to the company,38
prosecution of corporations in Britain today occurs with much
less frequency than in the United States.
Prosecutions of corporations, however, do occur in
Britain. A recent example is the case of R v. Innospec Ltd.,
where a British company and wholly owned subsidiary of a
Delaware corporation, Innospec Inc., pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to corrupt pursuant to section 1 of the Criminal Law
Act 1997.39 The DOJ, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) began
investigating the parent company, Innospec Inc., in July 2005,
and in October 2007 notified the SFO, which began its own
investigation in May 2008.40 The American investigation
revealed that between 2001 and 2004, Innospec Inc. entered
into five contracts under the United Nations’ Oil for Food
Program with the Iraq Ministry of Oil to sell tetraethyl lead,41
36

Id. In this way, British law resembles the United States Model Penal Code
and the laws of some individual states which have limited the principle of respondeat
superior to offenses that were authorized or tolerated by a corporation’s board of
directors or by high managerial staff acting on behalf of the corporation or within the
scope of employment. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
37
Jonathan Cotton, United Kingdom: A New, More American World?, INT’L FIN.
L. REV., THE 2009 GUIDE TO LITIGATION, Apr. 1, 2009 (internal quotation marks omitted),
available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/2176832/Channel/193438/United-Kingdom-A-newmore-American-world.html. Thus even today “criminal corporate liability would not
normally extend to crimes such as rape and murder” because they involve a moral
dimension, and it would be unlikely that the court could find that the “directing mind
and will” of the corporation “acted in the scope of employment and at least in part to
benefit the company” such that vicarious liability could attach. Weissmann & Newman,
supra note 23, at 419 n.17.
38
Cotton, supra note 37.
39
R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc. (EWCC) 7, [1] (Eng.).
40
Id. at [6].
41
Tetraethyl lead, or TEL, is an antiknock fuel additive, which has been
phased out of use by regulators since the 1970s because of health and environmental
concerns. Id. at [4].
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agreeing to pay the Ministry ten percent of the contract price
as a bribe.42
Investigators also discovered that in addition to the
bribes of the Iraq Ministry of Oil, Innospec Ltd., the British
subsidiary, bribed Indonesian officials to secure contracts from
the Indonesian government for the supply of tetraethyl lead.43
The Crown Court ultimately found that directors of Innospec
Ltd., whose executive offices were in Britain, had conspired
with the company and others to make payments of
approximately $8 million to senior government officials in
Indonesia in violation of section 1 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1906.44 In September 2008, independent
directors of Innospec Inc. admitted to the criminal offenses and
began discussions with American prosecutors to reach a “global
settlement.”45
In late 2009, the company agreed to plead guilty both to
offenses in the United States and the United Kingdom, subject
to court approval in both jurisdictions.46 Prosecutors at the SFO
and DOJ began discussions about the terms of the settlement
and how the penalty should be divided, finally deciding in
January 2010 that the SFO, DOJ, and the SEC and OFAC
together, would each receive a proportion of the settlement,
resulting in $14.1 million to the DOJ, $11.2 million to the SEC,
$2.2 million to OFAC, and $12.7 million to the SFO.47 Although
the fines and other penalties could have exceeded $400 million
in the United States and $150 million in the United Kingdom,
this would have put the company out of business. Thus
prosecutors agreed, in light of the company’s full admission and
cooperation, to limit the penalty.48 Innospec Ltd. also agreed to
establish a compliance and ethics program and to submit to
corporate monitoring for a period not less than three years,
with the monitor to be chosen in agreement with the SFO.49
42

Id. at [6]. After the United Nations Oil for Food Program was discontinued,
Innospec Inc. continued to make bribes resulting in a total of $5.8 million paid or
promised. Id.
43
Id. at [4].
44
Id. at [1], [4]-[5].
45
Id. at [7].
46
Id. at [8].
47
Id. at [13]. The SFO sought to recover $6.7 million of this amount in a
criminal penalty for the Indonesian corruption and $6 million in a civil recovery for the
Iraq corruption. Id. at [17(v)].
48
Id. at [7].
49
Id. at [18].
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Although the British court eventually approved the
global settlement, it held that prosecutors lack the authority to
set the penalty amount of such agreements.50 The court held
that in criminal cases involving a plea agreement between the
defendant (whether natural or artificial) and the government, a
prosecutor may assist the court in determining the appropriate
penalty.51 However, the court held that “principles of
transparent and open justice require a court sitting in public
itself first to determine by a hearing . . . the extent of the
criminal conduct on which the offender has entered the plea,
and then, on the basis of its determination as to the conduct,
the appropriate sentence.”52 This holding effectively limits the
ability of British prosecutors to negotiate and agree upon a
settlement amount with either the defendant corporation or
with foreign authorities.53
The court approved the power of prosecutors to issue a
Civil Recovery Order (CRO) for property obtained through the
unlawful conduct of a corporation.54 The court noted, however,
that it would “rarely be appropriate for criminal conduct by a
company to be dealt with by means of a [CRO].”55 Rather, a civil
penalty may provide a means of compensation in addition to a
fine in the case of corporate criminality. As a result, British
50

Id. at [26].
Id. at [27].
52
Id.
53
The court noted that while “there may be discussion and agreement as to
the basis of plea, a court must rigorously scrutinize in open court in the interests of
transparency and good governance the basis of that plea and to see whether it reflects
the public interest.” Id.
54
Id. at [37]; see infra Part III.B (discussing CROs). The SFO sought
approximately half of its share of the $12.7 million settlement in a civil recovery for the
conduct in Iraq. Innospec, [2010] EW Misc. (EWCC) at [13]. The SFO sought a civil
recovery, rather than a criminal penalty, in part because the SFO was concerned that
imposing a criminal penalty for the same conduct charged in the United States would
subject the corporation to double jeopardy. Id. at [37]. The British court disagreed, and
further stated that that in light of the unavailability of funds, the criminal penalty for
the conduct in Indonesia should not have been reduced by requiring a civil recovery for
the conduct in Iraq. Id. at [38]. Rather, the court noted that states should “adopt a
uniform approach to financial penalties for corruption of foreign government officials so
that the penalties in each country do not discriminate either favourably or
unfavourably against a company in a particular state.” Id. at [31]. The court reasoned
that “[i]f the penalties in one state are lower than in another, businesses in the state
with lower penalties will not be deterred so effectively from engaging in corruption in
foreign states, whilst businesses in states where the penalties are higher may complain
that they are disadvantaged in foreign states.” Id.
55
Id. at [38]. The court stated that “[i]t would be inconsistent with basic
principles of justice for the criminality of corporations to be glossed over by a civil as
opposed to a criminal sanction.” Id.
51
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prosecutors may be required to seek a criminal penalty, rather
than a civil recovery, where the “directing mind and will” of the
corporation has committed some unlawful conduct such that
liability could be imputed to the corporation. Nevertheless, R v.
Innospec Ltd. demonstrates that while prosecutions of
corporations in Britain occur with less frequency than in the
United States, they do happen and have serious consequences.
II.

CHANGES TO SUBSTANTIVE LAWS AND PROCEDURES IN
BRITAIN

The SFO and Parliament have been considering and
implementing changes to the substantive laws and procedural
mechanisms in Britain to strengthen the government’s ability
to combat corporate crime and to institute corporate reforms.
These developments widen the scope of corporate criminal
liability and alter the interaction between the SFO and
business organizations operating in Britain.
A.

Changes to Substantive Corporate Criminal Laws

While legislators in Britain have not yet changed the
general standard for imputing criminal liability to
corporations, Parliament has recently passed several statutes
that include specific offenses for corporate entities, thereby
broadening corporate criminal liability in certain instances.
In
2007,
Parliament
passed
the
Corporate
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, which created a
new homicide offense in which an organization will be found
guilty “if the way in which its activities are managed or
organised—(a) cause the person’s death, and (b) amounts to a
gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation
to the deceased.”56 The Act does not require that the
corporation’s “directing mind and will” be responsible.57 In early
2010, Parliament also passed the Bribery Act, which created
new offenses for bribing a foreign public official and for the
56

Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, c.19, § 1(1) (U.K.).
However, a corporation will only be found guilty if the “way in which its
activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a substantial
element” of the breach of the duty of care. Id. § 1(3). “Senior level” means individuals
“who make significant decisions about the organisation or substantial parts of it.”
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING THE CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER AND
CORPORATE HOMICIDE ACT 2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/
guidance/docs/manslaughterhomicideact07.pdf.
57
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failure of a corporation to prevent a bribe from being made on
its behalf.58 These changes to the laws considerably broaden the
scope of liability for corporate entities and demonstrate a shift
toward the American framework.
Further, the United Kingdom Law Commission, a body
appointed by the Lord Chancellor to examine and reform the
laws, is evaluating the existing corporate criminal laws as a
part of its project on the codification of substantive criminal
law.59 This suggests that further changes to the British system
should be anticipated.
B.

Developments at the Serious Fraud Office and Changes
to Legal Procedures

While Parliament considers reforming the substantive
laws, the SFO is undergoing structural changes and making
significant amendments to its procedures for dealing with
corporate wrongdoers.60 The SFO was established in 1988 by
the Criminal Justice Act 1987.61 The SFO is an independent
government department that investigates and prosecutes, as a
part of the British criminal justice system, overseas corruption
cases and “serious and complex fraud” cases exceeding a value

58

Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, §§ 1-3 (U.K.).
Corporate Criminal Liability, LAW COMMISSION (July 2, 2008), http://www.
lawcom.gov.uk/1150.htm.
60
Practical developments have also emerged, including an increase in the
level of fines or civil penalties and disgorgements that British companies have been
required to pay as a result of their wrongdoing. These increases resemble the high fines
levied against corporations in the United States. Cotton, supra note 37. Further,
individuals in the United Kingdom who have been involved in corporate crime are
being subjected to longer prison sentences, and the SFO has imposed greater asset
confiscation orders on these individuals, which are more reflective of the penalties
imposed on individuals in the United States. Id. “British law enforcement agents have
said they [also] want to develop their use of the American ‘campaign based
approach’ . . . in which investigators identify an industry they think is highly corrupt
and then try to bring simultaneous prosecution against a large number of people in it.”
Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Michael Peel, FBI Sting Nets 22 Executives in Bribery
Probe, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2010, 11:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/516f276c-054d11df-a85e-00144feabdc0.html (follow “Register For Free” hyperlink; then follow “Sign
Up” hyperlink under “Registered” column for free access).
61
History & Legislation, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/
about-us/history--legislation.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). During the 1970s and
early 1980s, the British public was unhappy with officials for failing to investigate and
prosecute serious and complex fraud. The government then established the Fraud
Trials Committee, which recommended that a new organization be responsible for
investigating and prosecuting these types of fraud. The Committee’s report spurred the
introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and, thereby, the SFO. Id.
59
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of £1 million.62 Like the DOJ, through the individual United
States Attorney’s Offices (like the SDNY), the SFO handles
both the investigation and prosecution of various cases.63
In 2006, the SFO, then under the direction of the
British Attorney General Lord Peter Goldsmith and SFO
Director Robert Wardle, was widely criticized for its decision to
halt investigation of BAE Systems for bribery after Saudi
Arabia threatened to cease purchasing aircrafts and sharing
anti-terrorism intelligence with Britain.64 In March 2007, Lord
Goldsmith decided that the agency “needed a thorough
makeover.”65 He invited Jessica de Grazia, a thirteen-year
62

Who We Are, supra note 3; see also Does the Fraud Fit SFO Criteria?,
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-policies-and-publications/
does-the-fraud-fit-sfo-criteria.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). The SFO investigates a
variety of frauds including investment fraud, bribery, corruption, corporate fraud, and
public sector fraud. See Kirchgaessner & Peel, supra note 60. “Fraud is a type of criminal
activity, defined as ‘intentional deception to obtain an advantage, avoid an obligation, or
cause loss to another person or company.’” Fraud, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE,
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/fraud.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2010); see also Fraud Act, 2006,
c.35, §§ 1-4 (U.K.) (defining fraud as false representation, failure to disclose information,
and abuse of position to require intent to realize personal gain or gain for another, to
cause loss to another, or to expose another to risk of loss). Factors that will be examined
in accepting a case of suspected fraud are whether there is “a significant international
dimension;” whether “the case [is] likely to be of widespread concern;” whether “the case
require[s] highly specialised knowledge, e.g. of financial markets;” and whether “there [is]
a need to use the SFO’s special powers, such as section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act.”
Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: An Update from the Serious Fraud
Office: The Way Forward (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/ourviews/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “An Update from the Serious Fraud Office:
The Way Forward” hyperlink). Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act refers to the
investigatory powers of the SFO where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a
serious and/or complex fraud or corruption has been committed. Criminal Justice Act,
1987, c.38, § 2, sch. 1 (U.K.).
63
DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 2. The DOJ and the United States Attorney’s
Offices are over two centuries old, however, while the SFO is only twenty years old and
still evolving. Id.
64
A Bit of an Old Boy’s Club, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 2, 2009, 7:22 PM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/2/3/a-bit-of-an-old-boys-club.html. The SFO was investigating
the affairs of BAE Systems with regard to the Al Yamamah defense contract with the
government of Saudi Arabia, and ceased the investigation citing “the need to safeguard
national and international security.” Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE
Systems Plc/Saudi Arabia (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/pressroom/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2006/bae-systems-plcsaudi-arabia.aspx. The
investigation centered on allegations that the company had bribed Saudi Arabian
government officials in exchange for the sale of Typhoon jet fighters. SFO to Request
Prosecution of BAE, FCPA BLOG (Sept. 30, 2009, 8:13 PM), http://www.fcpablog.
com/blog/2009/10/1/sfo-to-request-prosecution-of-bae.html. On September 30, 2009, the
SFO announced that it intended “to seek the Attorney General’s consent to prosecute
BAE Systems for offenses relating to overseas corruption,” but the sales to Saudi
Arabia were not part of the request for the prosecution. Id.
65
David Leppard, She Came, She Saw, She Scythed Through the SFO, TIMES
ONLINE (U.K.) (Feb. 1, 2009), http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/
article5627453.ece.
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Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan to evaluate the
agency with “unrestricted remit.”66 Her commentary
“amount[ed] to one of the most damning official indictments of
a government agency ever penned.”67 In her 157-page final
report, de Grazia emphasized that the “SFO uses significantly
more resources per case” than the SDNY and the District
Attorney’s Office of New York (DANY) and “achieves
significantly less for its efforts, as measured by both its
productivity (the number of defendants prosecuted) and its
conviction rate.”68 She traced these facts to both external
factors, including “laws, government policy, and legal
professional rules and practices,” and internal factors of “the
SFO’s own policies and practices,” including skills shortages,
inadequate management and leadership, lack of clarity about
roles and responsibilities, insufficient early case screening,
unfocused investigations, risk-averse culture, and ineffective
use of powers.69
As a result of the report, in April 2008, several top
officials at the SFO were fired, along with Director Wardle,
who was replaced by Richard Alderman, a senior lawyer at HM
Revenue & Customs.70 Under Alderman, the SFO began a
66
67

Id.
Id.

68

DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 3. For example, in a prosecution of criminal
conspiracy in the Allied Deals case

where the acts on both sides of the Atlantic were the same, SDNY used a total
team of eight to convict 14 defendants in a third of the time that it took for an
SFO team totaling 31 to prosecute four defendants, three of whom were convicted
after an eight-month trial.
Id. With regard to productivity and conviction rate,
[i]n 2007, the SFO employed 56 staff attorneys and spent an additional
£4,227,000 on external counsel. . . . During the five-year period FY 2003-2007, the
SFO prosecuted to conclusion a total of 166 defendants. In contrast the DANY
Frauds Bureau . . . which is staffed by only 19 lawyers (slightly less than a third
of the SFO’s permanent legal staff) and [which] does not contract out any aspect
of its work to the external bar, concluded the prosecution of 124 defendants in the
same period.
Id.; see also infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing contract staff).
Further, “during the five-year period of 2003-2007, the SFO’s average conviction rate
was only 61% of defendants whose cases were concluded during this period. During the
same period, DANY’s Frauds Bureau had a 92% conviction rate.” DE GRAZIA, supra
note 11, at 3.
69
DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 6-13.
70
Leppard, supra note 65. The Financial Services Authority (FSA), an
independent body that regulates the financial services industry, has also been
reviewing its procedures and appointed a new Chief Criminal Counsel in March 2009.
Cotton, supra note 37.
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“fundamental rethink about its role, its culture and how it
operates.”71 At a speech only two months into his tenure,
Alderman indicated that he believed the SFO needed to have a
bigger presence in the City72 and that it should develop its role
in order to “provide the framework that is needed for a leading
financial centre.”73 He noted that, under his predecessor,
“everything [was] geared to investigating complex cases and
getting them to court for often lengthy trials.”74 Alderman,
however, believed that prosecution would not always be
appropriate and began to look for alternatives.75
Alderman became interested in incorporating some of
the procedural tools that the DOJ had at its disposal,
specifically Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements.76 In the
view of SFO General Counsel Vivian Robinson, these
agreements are an “efficient and cost-effective way of disposing
of appropriate cases as an alternative to often drawn-out
prosecution through the courts . . . [and] have considerable
deterrent effect.”77 Further, she believed that these agreements
produce corporate reform by incentivizing corporations to selfpolice and report wrongdoing to the government.78
While the SFO does not yet have the ability to enter into
Deferred or Non-Prosecution Agreements with corporations
that have acted unlawfully, the SFO has begun to incorporate
some of the central features of these agreements into
Compliance Agreements,79 which are used in conjunction with
civil statutes to achieve corporate reform. These changes, both
in procedure and in substance, alter the relationship between
the SFO and corporate entities, and strengthen the ability of
the SFO to reform the behavior of corporate wrongdoers.
71

Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: Rotary Club of the
City & Shoreditch (July 17, 2008), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/ourviews/speeches/speeches-2008.aspx (follow “Rotary Club of the City & Shoreditch”
hyperlink).
72
The “City” refers to the “Square Mile” of the financial and commercial
heart of Britain in London. It is used colloquially the same way as “Wall Street” is used
in the United States to indicate a concentration of capital, legal, and regulatory
systems of the financial market. Like the colloquial “Wall Street,” the “City” refers to
both a physical place where many financial buildings are located as well as the greater
theoretical place of financial markets.
73
Alderman, supra note 71.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Robinson, supra note 4.
78
Id.
79
See infra Part III.B.
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COMPARISON OF BRITISH COMPLIANCE AGREEMENTS AND
AMERICAN DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS

In the United States, with Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements, reformation of a corporate wrongdoer
is largely a process that occurs within the criminal law context.
With the British adoption of Compliance Agreements,
reformation of a corporate wrongdoer may occur within the
civil law arena. Despite this fundamental difference, the SFO
has created a procedure that achieves many of the aims of the
DOJ, including providing incentives for corporations to selfpolice ex ante and, once a corporation is found to have engaged
in some unlawful conduct, to institute reforms and pay
restitution ex post.
A.

Reforming Corporate Behavior Through Deferred and
Non-Prosecution Agreements

The most widely used procedure in American corporate
criminal cases today is Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements. Although these agreements have existed since the
early 1980s, they were rarely used in the corporate criminal
context until 2003,80 when the Holder Memorandum,81 and
subsequently the Thompson Memorandum,82 provided for their
80

Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 315-17 (2007). The first case in which a procedure
resembling a Deferred Prosecution Agreement was used was a government
investigation into Salomon Brothers for securities fraud violations. Peter Spivak &
Suijit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 163-64 (2008). The first actual Deferred
Prosecution Agreement involving a major company occurred in 1994, when the SDNY
“agreed to defer prosecution of Prudential Securities for securities fraud for three
years, in return for substantial internal reforms.” Id. at 164.
81
The Holder Memorandum was issued in 1999, by then-Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder, and set forth guidelines for indicting corporations as a response to
“a group of private practitioners complaining that there was no uniformity in the way
in which prosecutors decided to indict corporations.” Peter Lattman, The Holder Memo
and Its Progeny, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2006, 8:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo.
82
The Thompson Memorandum was issued in 2003, by then-Deputy Attorney
General Larry Thompson. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y
Gen., on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. to the Heads of Dep’t Components
& U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate
_guidelines.htm. The McNulty Memorandum was issued in 2006 and made two major
changes to the Thompson Memorandum in light of United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp.
2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006): the DOJ (1) could no longer consider as a negative factor a
company’s refusal to waive attorney-client privilege and (2) could no longer cut off the
payment of legal fees for employees who were being investigated by the government.
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use as an alternative to indicting a corporation and proceeding
with trial.
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements are
essentially contracts offered by the prosecutor to a corporation
after an alleged wrongdoing within the organization has
occurred. Such agreements are signed and filed at the charging
stage, at which point a criminal Complaint or Information is
filed with the court.83 Typically, these agreements require that
the company (1) pledge to admit wrongdoing, (2) waive the
statute of limitations, (3) consent to the agreement being
admissible in court, (4) agree to cease violating the law, (5)
assist the government in prosecuting individuals associated
with the crimes, (6) pledge that employees will not violate the
terms of the agreement, and (7) pay restitution and fines.84 In
exchange, the prosecutor guarantees that he or she will
postpone or drop prosecution.85 Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements can be, in essence, a form of probation for the
corporation, typically lasting between approximately one and
three years.86
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements make it
possible for the government to extract promises from corporate
entities to improve their structure and behavior, without
having to prove any misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt in a
court of law. Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements
incentivize corporations to self-police ex ante by establishing
See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Principles of Fed.
Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. to the Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12,
2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. In United
States v. Stein, KPMG came under investigation for illegal tax shelters. The Thompson
Memorandum provided that advancing attorney’s fees to employees of a target
corporation might viewed by the government as “protection” of individual actors, and
prosecutors were instructed that they could take this into account in deciding whether
to indict the corporation. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 337-38. Although KPMG had a
policy of paying the attorney’s fees of its employees, KPMG decided in light of its
conversations with the government to withhold attorney’s fees if the employee refused
to cooperate with the government. Id. at 345-46. The court held that the government,
by pressuring KPMG to cut off the legal fees of individual employees in order to meet
the terms of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, violated the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights of the individual defendants. Id. at 345. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the decision to dismiss the charges against the individual employees
because no remedy could cure the government’s constitutional violations. United States
v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008).
83
Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853,
888-89 (2007).
84
Lawrence D. Finder et al., Betting the Corporation: Compliance or
Defiance?, 28 CORP. COUNS. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
85
Id.
86
See Griffin, supra note 80, at 321.
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“voluntary” corporate compliance programs to avoid
prosecution altogether, or to avoid more punitive sentences if
they are nevertheless found to have participated in some
wrongful conduct.87 The agreements have this effect in part
because the prosecutor is instructed to evaluate whether the
corporation has adopted and implemented a “truly effective”
compliance program in deciding whether or not to enter into
the Deferred or Non-Prosecution Agreement after a finding of
corporate misconduct.88 If the corporation has done so, the
prosecutor may decide to charge only the corporation’s
employees and agents, or to mitigate charges or sanctions
against the corporation.89 As a result of Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements and changes to corporate law brought
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,90 a vast majority of
corporations in the United States have established “voluntary”
compliance programs largely out of the fear of the threat of
prosecution.91
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements also give the
federal government a greater ability to pursue individual
wrongdoers.92 In deciding whether to enter into a Deferred or
Non-Prosecution Agreement with a corporation, prosecutors
are instructed to consider the adequacy of prosecuting the
individuals responsible for the corporation’s wrongdoing.93 The
prosecutor is further instructed to evaluate the corporation’s
willingness to replace responsible management or to discipline
or terminate the responsible employees.94 In order to pursue
individual wrongdoers, prosecutors often require corporations
to conduct an internal investigation, which includes disclosing
information about individual actors in order to receive
87

Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What
Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 526
(2008) (footnotes omitted).
88
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-28.800 (as amended
in 2008) [hereinafter USAM]. The programs must also be “designed, implemented,
reviewed, and revised, as appropriate . . . .” Finder et al., supra note 84, at 23.
89
USAM, supra note 88, § 9-28.800.
90
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
91
See Finder et al., supra note 84, at 14 n.42. As of January 22, 2009 “over
89% of publicly traded companies [in the United States] have a compliance program,
8% have only an ethics program, and 5% have neither an ethics program nor
compliance program . . . .” Id. Further, “69% of private companies have a compliance
program, 12% have only an ethics program, and 29% have neither . . . .” Id.
92
See Alschuler, supra note 20.
93
USAM, supra note 88, § 9-28.300.
94
Id.
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mitigating credit for cooperating with the government.95 This
requirement gives prosecutors unparalleled access to
information about the alleged crimes and actors, thereby
allowing the government to bring charges that may not have
otherwise been possible due to insufficient evidence.96 In this
regard, the corporation becomes a type of “investigative
partner” to the government.97
With the use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements, federal prosecutors also seek to institute reforms
of corporate wrongdoers to ensure that the unlawful activity
does not continue or recur. These agreements assist
prosecutors in achieving this goal by requiring the corporation
to hire a monitor, typically charged with retraining employees,
suggesting changes to the pre-existing compliance program,
restructuring whole sectors, and removing executives.98 These
monitors are notoriously expensive.99
The threat of criminal prosecution also gives
prosecutors the power to demand that a target corporation pay
significant fines when it executes a Deferred or NonProsecution Agreement. The payments may be styled as
damages, punitive fines, compensation to settle civil lawsuits,
disgorgements, or back-taxes.100 These fines have ranged from
thousands of dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars and are
often vastly disproportionate to the monetary value of the
wrongdoing.101
Because of the increased ability of prosecutors to reform
business organizations through Deferred and Non-Prosecution
95

An internal investigation requires a corporation to disclose the “relevant
facts” concerning misconduct of the corporation and of individuals. Memorandum from
Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. to
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys 9-11, 15-16 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.
96
See Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1458 (2007).
97
E.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (where
the government required the corporation to conduct an extensive internal investigation
in order to satisfy the terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement); see also supra note
82 (discussing Stein).
98
Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring”
Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 35 AM. J. L. &
MED. 89, 100-01 (2009).
99
Id.
100
Garrett, supra note 83, at 900.
101
Id. From January 2003 to January 2007, the DOJ entered into thirty-five
agreements producing a total of $4.95 billion in restitution and averaging $141 million
per agreement. Id.
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Agreements, these agreements have become the “sanction of
choice” in cases of corporate misconduct.102 From 1993 to 2008,
the United States government entered into a total of 112
agreements with various corporations.103 During this time, the
government refrained from filing any criminal charges against
a major corporation without also entering into a Deferred or
Non-Prosecution Agreement.104
These agreements are most frequently used in cases
where entities have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA),105 which prohibits corporations and employees from
bribing foreign officials and requires corporate entities to meet
certain accounting requirements, including maintaining
accurate accounting records and a system of internal
accounting controls.106 But Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements have been used in a variety of instances of
corporate wrongdoing, most notably in cases of tax evasion,
securities fraud, and health care fraud. With the widespread
use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, “pretrial
diversion has become the ‘standard’ means for conducting
corporate criminal investigations.”107
B.

The British Civil Recovery Order and Corporate
Compliance Agreements

In Britain, the intent requirement in many corporate
crimes is relatively high, and, as a result, successful
102

Boozang & Hutchinson, supra note 98, at 97.
Finder et al., supra note 84, at 1. See id. at 3 for a list of the agreements
from 2006-2008.
104
Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 167. Milberg Weiss Bershad &
Schulman and Reliant Energy Services are “arguable exceptions” because Milberg
refused to enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement citing that the waiver of
attorney-client privilege was “too onerous,” and, in the case of Reliant, although the
government believed that it was “uncooperative” with the investigation, Reliant finally
agreed to enter into an agreement in return for the dismissal of the indictment. Id. at
n.42; see also infra note 159 (discussing the demise of Arthur Andersen after refusing
to cooperate with authorities).
105
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
106
David Hess & Christie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 313-14
(2008); see also Marika Marris & Erika Singer, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 43 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 575, 580-81 (2006). The Organization on Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention went into effect in 1999 and all
countries that ratified the agreement, including the United Kingdom, now have similar
statutory provisions to the FCPA. The Convention requires that each signatory country
“criminalize the bribery of foreign officials.” Id. at 594.
107
Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 159.
103
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prosecution by the SFO of corporate wrongdoers is difficult.
Therefore corporations in Britain do not face a threat of
criminal prosecution comparable to that faced by corporations
operating in the United States, and the SFO cannot rely upon
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements to regulate
corporate criminal misconduct. Instead of importing Deferred
and Non-Prosecution Agreement procedures unchanged, the
SFO has adopted a form of these agreements—the Compliance
Agreement—to be used in conjunction with civil statutes. One
such civil statute is the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, in which
Parliament gave the SFO the right, through the use of a Civil
Recovery Order (CRO), to recover from a person, natural or
artificial, any property “which is or represents property
obtained through unlawful conduct.”108 The CRO does not
require the government to prove the culpability of any person,
but rather requires it to proceed in rem against any proceeds
traceable to any unlawful conduct and thereby obtain
restitution for the wrongdoing.109 By using the CRO in
conjunction with a Compliance Agreement, the SFO is able to
regulate corporate conduct and institute reforms, thereby
achieving many of the same goals of prosecutors in the United
States. This also allows the SFO to conserve resources for cases
of corporate wrongdoing severe enough to merit prosecution.
In 2008, the SFO successfully obtained its first CRO
against a major business organization. Balfour Beatty, an
engineering and construction corporation, had been engaged in
a joint venture to build the Bibliotheca Alexandria in Egypt.110
The corporation monitored its own accounting practices as
required under section 221 of the Companies Act 1985, which
sets forth the standards for maintaining accurate business
records.111 During the project, Balfour Beatty discovered
108

Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c.29, pmbl. (U.K.).
Id. §§ 243, 304.
110
Press Release, Balfour Beatty, Balfour Beatty Reaches Full Settlement of
Issues Relating to Bibliotheca Alexandria Project (Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Balfour Press
Release], available at http://www.balfourbeatty.com/bby/media/press/2008/2008-10-06.
111
Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Balfour Beatty plc (Oct. 6, 2008)
[hereinafter SFO Press Release], available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latestpress-releases/press-releases-2008/balfour-beatty-plc.aspx. Section 221 of the Companies
Act, 1985, c.40 (U.K.), provides that
109

[e]very company shall keep accounting records which are sufficient to show and
explain the company’s transactions and are such as to (a) disclose with reasonable
accuracy, at any time, the financial position of the company at that time, and (b)
enable the directors to ensure that any balance sheet and profit and loss account
prepared under this Part complies with the requirements of this Act.
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inaccurate accounting records due to “certain payment
irregularities” at one of its subsidiaries, and reported this
finding to the SFO.112 As a result, Balfour Beatty agreed to
forfeit to the government £2.25 million obtained through
unlawful conduct and to contribute to the costs of
proceedings.113 The SFO pursued civil recovery rather than
criminal prosecution, concluding that an indictment could not
be brought against the corporation or any individual since no
financial benefit was derived by any individual employee and
most of the “relevant individuals” were no longer employed at
Balfour Beatty or its subsidiaries.114
The SFO combined its civil recovery procedure with a
Compliance Agreement that largely mirrored a NonProsecution Agreement. Though the Companies Act does not
require companies to self-police ex ante, Balfour Beatty had
established a voluntary compliance program as previously
suggested by the SFO, conducted its own “fully documented
internal investigation of the irregularities,” and reported its
findings to the SFO for further investigation.115 Once Balfour
Beatty came under investigation, it cooperated fully with the
SFO and “voluntarily” agreed to introduce certain compliance
systems.116 This involved requiring Balfour Beatty to take
“comprehensive steps to review and improve its control
processes,” and to submit to a form of external monitoring for a
set period of time.117
The SFO touted the power it wielded in the case of
Balfour Beatty as a demonstration of its “commit[ment] to
combating improper corporate behaviour in line with similar
efforts being made in other jurisdictions.”118 While the SFO did
not prosecute the company, it publicized its ability to obtain
civil restitution and to mandate corporate reformation, thereby
demonstrating its ability to sanction a major corporate

Id. The Companies Act also describes the information that the accounting records must
contain. Id.
112
Balfour Press Release, supra note 110.
113
Id.
114
SFO Press Release, supra note 111.
115
Balfour Press Release, supra note 110.
116
SFO Press Release, supra note 111.
117
Id. No further details exist as to the remedial measures that Balfour
Beatty was required to undertake pursuant to the agreement, either with regard to the
identity or duties of the monitor, or as to the length of time that he or she was to
remain with the corporation. For a discussion of monitors, see infra Part V.C.
118
SFO Press Release, supra note 111.
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wrongdoer without the use of criminal laws.119 The SFO
emphasized that Balfour Beatty would be the first of many
cases that would require a corporate wrongdoer to self-police,
report to the government, pay restitution, and institute
reforms, as corporations do under the Deferred and NonProsecution procedure in the United States.
Despite the success in the case of Balfour Beatty, the
SFO has imported a controversial American procedure and
Compliance Agreements will likely be subject to many of the
same criticisms of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements.
However, the achievement of corporate reform and restitution
without the threat of criminal sanctions may suggest ways in
which Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements can be
improved.
IV.

PROBLEMS WITH IMPORTING A FORM OF DEFERRED AND
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS

By importing a form of Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements, the SFO will likely face many of the same
criticisms as the DOJ since it began to use these agreements,
including the production of inconsistent agreements that are
not regulated by statute or subject to judicial review. But the
SFO may face unique problems, including the failure to prompt
corporate entities to report wrongdoing and the production of
uncertainty in the application and use of Compliance
Agreements. These anticipated shortcomings stem in part from
the fact the SFO is importing a procedure that was designed for
use in the criminal context.
A.

Inconsistency Between Agreements and Lack of Oversight

One of the most significant criticisms of Deferred and
Non-Prosecution Agreements in the United States is that the
guidelines for offering and entering into these agreements are
not regulated by statute. Instead, the DOJ “has published a
series of memoranda designed to guide its prosecutors in
developing a more uniform approach to corporate conduct and
to inform the defense bar and general public about the factors
that [DOJ] prosecutors may take into consideration when
making charging decisions.”120 Because the guidelines are not
119
120

Id.
Ridge & Baird, supra note 23, at 191.
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codified, they may change with every new Attorney General,
each of whom may put forth his or her own agreement policy.121
While the guidelines have been recently incorporated into the
United States Attorney’s Manual (USAM), they are still subject
to change without approval from any legislative body.122
Although the Proceeds of Crime Act and the CRO
procedure in Britain were enacted by Parliament, a
memorandum promulgated by SFO Director Alderman gave
prosecutors the power to enter into and set the terms of
Compliance Agreements. The Approach of the SFO to Dealing
with Overseas Corruption, known as “the Guide” for
prosecutors, was published after the investigation of Balfour
Beatty at the request of corporate executives in the City.123 The
Guide, which pertains only to overseas corruption cases like
that of Balfour Beatty, may be changed or replaced without the
consent of Parliament.
Compounding this problem is the fact that Compliance
Agreements, like Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements,
are not subject to judicial oversight. Although prosecutors must
appear before a judge in order to obtain a CRO, the judge does
not retain any discretion over the terms of the Compliance
Agreement. Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements have
been widely criticized for this reason in the United States
because federal prosecutors have the unilateral authority to
decide whether the corporation has engaged in any unlawful
activity, and if so, to determine what the terms of the resulting
agreement will be and whether the corporation or its employees
have met or breached the terms of the agreement, without any
judicial review.124
Another problem with Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements is that the DOJ does not require public disclosure
121

For example, Attorney General Paul McNulty promulgated significant
changes to Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreement procedures in a 2006
Memorandum. See supra notes 81-82.
122
See id.; USAM, supra note 88, ch. 9-28.
123
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, APPROACH OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE TO
DEALING WITH OVERSEAS CORRUPTION 1 (2009) [hereinafter SFO Guide], available at
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/28313/approach%20of%20the%20sfo%20to%20dealing%20
with%20overseas%20corruption.pdf.
124
Federal judges have oversight of plea agreements and charging decisions,
however. Garrett, supra note 83, at 906. Judges can either accept or reject plea
agreements, and can “examine voluntariness, factual basis, fairness, abuse of
discretion, or infringement on the judge’s sentencing power” in their review. Id.
Although the “[f]ederal courts are more involved in reviewing plea bargains than
charging decisions, . . . judges still remain highly deferential.” Id.
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of the terms of the agreements.125 In the United States, some
agreements have never been made public. The SFO has
required slightly more disclosure, though not enough. The
Guide provides that after the corporation has come under
investigation by the SFO and agreed to forfeit a specified
amount to the government, the corporation must make a public
statement.126 While the SFO and the target entity must agree
on the content of the public statement, the Guide does not
describe what facts must be disclosed.127 Indeed, very little has
been disclosed by Balfour Beatty or the SFO in press releases,
and the actual terms of the agreement are not public.128
Another major criticism of Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements in the United States is the
inconsistency between agreements in different cases.
Inconsistency has resulted, in part, because “ninety-four
United States Attorney’s Offices and six divisions of Main
Justice” have the authority to enter into, and to set the terms
of, Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements.129 Inconsistency
between agreements also results from the particular
requirements and needs of the prosecutor. In many cases, the
terms of an agreement “could very likely turn on the luck of the
draw regarding which office happens to handle the
prosecution.”130
The SFO may be able to avoid this basic problem of
inconsistency, as it is the only office thus far in the United
Kingdom that has entered into Compliance Agreements. This
ensures that, at the very least, the prosecutor offering the
agreement may be familiar with and have access to the terms
of prior agreements. Whether or not the prosecutor chooses to
follow the terms set forth in prior agreements, however, is
within the discretion of the individual attorney, and thus
agreements may still be inconsistent. Further, the SFO, unlike
United States Attorney’s Offices, uses contract attorneys who
125

See Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 180-81.
SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 3.
127
Id. at 3-4.
128
See Balfour Press Release, supra note 110; SFO Press Release, supra note 111.
129
See Ridge & Baird, supra note 23, at 191.
130
Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 171-72. See id. at 171-75 for a
comparison of requirements in Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements issued by
the SDNY and the District of New Jersey. Further complicating this issue in the
United States is that prosecutors at the state Attorney General’s offices also have
authority to prosecute corporations and to enter into their own Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements.
126
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conduct all Crown Court and appellate advocacy, including the
preparatory work.131 Contracting out cases to attorneys
undermines the accountability of prosecutors and of the SFO as
a whole, and it jeopardizes the continuity of knowledge and
decision-making in both specific cases and the SFO’s
prosecution practices in general.132
By importing American procedures without improving
upon them, the SFO is likely to face many of the same
criticisms as the DOJ. The SFO’s refusal to provide uniform,
codified guidance on the use and terms of these agreements is
likely to result in uncertainty and inconsistency in different
cases. The absence of judicial oversight leaves prosecutors with
powerful tools that are unchecked and may be abused. The
SFO’s failure to require public disclosure also creates
uncertainty among corporate directors in making risk
assessments ex ante, which heaps substantial costs on
companies, employees, and shareholders, and could present
problems for attorneys and consultants who are often hired to
advise on corporate compliance programs.133
Despite these likely problems, policymakers at both the
DOJ and the SFO maintain that by providing only “general”
guidelines on the terms of the agreements, prosecutors have
the flexibility to tailor the agreements on a case-by-case basis
and to experiment, which may over time lead to the emergence
of best practices.134 However, as shown in the past decade in the
United States, “best practices” are unlikely to emerge. Instead,
“best practices” simply become the most “common practices.”135

131

DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 57. In 2006-2007, the SFO spent £4,227,000
on contract barristers alone. Id. at 3. The Crown Court deals with more serious
criminal cases, some of which are referred or on appeal from the Magistrates’ Court. Id.
at 120. Neither the DOJ nor any state prosecutors in the United States contract out
any part of a prosecution. See id. at 3, 57.
132
De Grazia suggested that the SFO cease using contract attorneys for this
reason. See id. at 6-7.
133
Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 173. However, the failure to provide
this guidance could have the opposite effect, making certain attorneys (such as ex-SFO
staff) more valuable if they have internal, specific expertise about the SFO and its
prosecutorial decision-making processes that is otherwise difficult to acquire.
134
See id. at 173-74.
135
See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 294 (2006). “Best
practices” with regard to regulations set forth by agencies, for example, often create
harmonized practices rather than prompt regulators to develop alternatives. Id. at 325.
And on a global level, “best practices” may simply become a tool of international
harmonization. Id. at 318-21.
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And the only consistent trait of Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements is that they are inconsistent.136
B.

Limitations in Reporting Wrongdoing Despite
Incentivizing Corporations to Self-Police

One goal of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements
is to create incentives for corporations to self-police ex ante and
thereby establish corporate cultures designed to deter
employee misconduct. The DOJ achieves this goal by promising
less punitive sentences if the target entity was found to have
established an “effective” compliance program before the
wrongdoing occurred.137 Similarly, the SFO seeks to “bring
about behavioral change within businesses themselves” by
incentivizing corporations to establish voluntary compliance
programs, designed and implemented by management, which
set forth internal regulations and programs to assist
compliance officers in self-policing.138
The SFO creates these incentives by first recommending
in the Guide that corporations have self-policing programs in
place before ever coming under investigation.139 The SFO also
threatens higher sanctions if it discovers unlawful activity
within the corporation without the assistance of the entity
itself.140 In such case, “[t]he prospects of a criminal investigation
followed by prosecution and confiscation order are much
greater, particularly if the corporat[ion] was aware of the
problem and had decided not to self report.”141
One common problem of both Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements and Compliance Agreements is that
even a corporation’s good faith effort to self-police may still lead
to a failure of the corporation to report unlawful activity to the
government. This may occur, for example, because the
compliance officer failed to find the fraud despite a strong selfpolicing program. In this case, both the DOJ and the SFO

136

Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 172-73; see also Finder et al., supra
note 84, at 11-13 (discussing how Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements have
changed over time with regard to the needs of the government in each case).
137
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
138
SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 2.
139
See id. at 1-2.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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would hold the failure to self-report as a negative factor against
the company.142
The requirement that a corporation self-police and
report the unlawful activity to the SFO in order to gain
mitigation points creates unique problems in Britain. If a
compliance officer detects that low-level employees, rather than
the “directing mind and will” of the corporation, committed a
crime, he may be eager to report to the SFO because the
corporation itself will likely only face civil penalties. Such was
the case in the Balfour Beatty investigation.143 However, if the
compliance officer anticipates that the corporation’s high-level
employees, or the “directing mind and will” of the corporation,
committed the crime, he may be reluctant to report to the SFO,
knowing that the corporation would be more likely to face
criminal charges. Compounding this problem is the fact that
the SFO has not provided any guidance as to whether a
corporation could gain mitigation credits for reporting
wrongdoing if a criminal prosecution resulted from the
investigation. As a result, the SFO’s policy to give credit to
corporations that establish corporate compliance programs and
self-police may only assist the SFO in identifying instances of
wrongdoing by low-level employees, necessarily resulting only
in civil penalties.
C.

Uncertainty in the Application of the Compliance
Agreement Procedure

In the United States, Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements can be used in response to any type of criminal
activity. In Britain, Compliance Agreements have only been
used in cases of foreign bribery, and then only in conjunction
with CROs.144 There is also no indication that the SFO would
consider entering into a Compliance Agreement in a situation
where the corporation could be held criminally responsible for
violating a statute that provides a specific offense for
corporations, such as the Corporate Manslaughter and
Corporate Homicide Act and the Bribery Act.145
142

Id. at 8.
See supra Part III.B.
144
See supra Part III.B.
145
See supra Part II.A. In fact, the case of R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc.
(EWCC) 7 (Eng.), may prohibit the SFO from seeking a civil recovery where criminal
penalty is possible. See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
143
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If the recent history of corporate criminal prosecution in
the United States is any prediction, it is likely that the SFO
will increase its efforts to encourage companies to self-police for
all types of criminal wrongdoing. Congress enacted the FCPA
in 1977, which provided criminal sanctions for individuals who
bribed public officials, and encouraged public companies to
create and maintain records of the way that employees used
corporate assets.146 As a result of the passage of the FCPA,
attorneys began advising corporate clients of the need to create
and maintain “internal processes” designed to deter employees
from acting in contravention of the statute.147 As a result, most,
if not all, American corporations have some kind of self-policing
program in place that now detects a variety of employee
misconduct.148
Similarly, after the SFO’s positive response to Balfour
Beatty’s internal monitoring program that detected foreign
bribery, British attorneys have begun to advise corporate
clients of the increased need to establish internal processes
designed to monitor all types of employee misconduct.149 In
addition, statutes such as the Corporate Manslaughter and
Corporate Homicide Act encourage corporations to self-police
and report wrongdoing to the government.150 Moreover,
146
147

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 962-

963 (2009).
148

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
Client Alerts about the increased need for corporate compliance programs
have been published by a number of international firms. See, e.g., The UK’s Serious
Fraud Office Announces Guide to Self-Reporting of Overseas Corruption by
Corporations, INT’L REG. BULL. (Bryan Cave LLP), July 23, 2009, available at http://
www.bryancave.com/bulletins/list.aspx?Date=2009 (follow “The UK’s Serious Fraud
Office Announces Guide to Self-Reporting of Overseas Corruption by Corporations”
hyperlink); The Criminalisation of Corporate Conduct, BRIEFING (Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP), May 2009, available at http://www.freshfields.com/
publications/pdfs/2009/may09/25753.pdf; William Jacobson et al., Two Recent Cases
Show UK Is Active in Enforcement of Foreign Bribery Laws, FULBRIGHT BRIEFING
(Fulbright & Jaworski LLP), Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://www.fulbright.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub_id=3619&site_id=494&detail=yes; Sarah
E. Steicker & James T. Parkinson, US DOJ and SEC Aggressively Pursuing FCPA Cases;
SEC Forms Specialized FCPA Enforcement Unit, FCPA WATCH (Mayer Brown LLP),
Aug. 20, 2009, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id
=7442&nid=6; see also Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: Recent
Developments at the Serious Fraud Office (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.
gov.uk/about-us/our-views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “Recent developments”
hyperlink) (discussing the SFO’s plan to continue using Compliance Agreements).
150
The Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act provides that in
considering the actions of corporations, the jury can evaluate “the extent to which the
evidence shows that there were attitudes, policies, systems, or accepted practices
within the organisation that were likely to have encouraged any such failure [of due
149
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Alderman has announced that he seeks to expand the use of
Compliance Agreements151 and may do so by using those
agreements in response to different kinds of misconduct.
Consequently, corporations are more likely to establish
programs designed to deter all kinds of employee wrongdoing,
and the SFO may increasingly consider these programs when
evaluating the liability of the corporation and whether to
pursue prosecution.
With policymakers in the United Kingdom importing
procedures designed to effect corporate reform, multinational
organizations face additional burdens. For example, differing
substantive laws in various countries subject multinational
corporations to different standards of liability and varying
penalties. One pertinent example is the statutes governing
foreign corruption in each jurisdiction which define bribery
differently. Federal substantive law allows for facilitation
payments,152 while British law does not.153 A compliance program
in a multinational corporation would have to account for these
differences. Facilitation payments are only one example of
thousands of variations in the laws that could trigger liability
in one jurisdiction but not the other. The converse is also true;
unlawful conduct committed by employees in one office in a

care] . . . or to have produced tolerance of it . . . .” Corporate Manslaughter and
Homicide Act, 2007 c.19, § 8(3)(a) (U.K.).
151
In April 2009, Alderman stated that the SFO was “already identifying
cases where there is clear evidence to establish that property was obtained through
unlawful conduct” such that a CRO could be issued. Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious
Fraud Office, Speech: The Changing Face of Fraud Trials (Apr. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “The
Changing Face of Fraud Trials” hyperlink). As recently as July 15, 2010, Alderman
stated that the SFO “remain[s] very committed to [its] guidance and to the use of civil
recovery in appropriate cases” and that, in addition to issuing more CROs, “[t]here will
be more prosecutions to follow.” Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech:
Eversheds Round Table Discussion (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/
about-us/our-views/speeches/speeches-20010.aspx (follow “Evershed Round Table
Discussion” hyperlink).
152
Facilitation payments assist a corporation in securing the issuance of work
papers, police protection, mail delivery, electrical or plumbing services, or product
clearance through customs. In order to qualify for exemption from liability, the
payments must (1) “relate to a routine government action and be modest in amount,”
(2) the corporation must be able to show that the payment “affected the timing rather
than the substance” of the government action, and (3) the corporation must be able to
show that payment was required in order to protect against the destruction of an
important commercial interest or risk to employees. Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious
Fraud Office, Speech: Talking Corruption with the SFO (Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “Talking
Corruption with the SFO” hyperlink).
153
Id.
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multinational corporation may subject it to further
investigation and liability in multiple jurisdictions.154
In addition, the SFO and the DOJ may not look to the
same factors in evaluating the effectiveness of a compliance
program. The SFO Guide states that prosecutors will examine
a variety of enumerated factors,155 while the USAM has no
formulaic requirements. Further complicating the issue is that
neither the DOJ nor the SFO will evaluate a corporation’s
compliance program in advance of an investigation to give an
opinion as to whether it would be viewed as “effective” in a
later proceeding.156 This leaves multinational corporations
operating in both jurisdictions with different sets of vague
standards by which to model their compliance programs.
V.

SUCCESSES OF COMPLIANCE AGREEMENTS AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING DEFERRED AND NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS

Despite the anticipated shortcomings of the Compliance
Agreement procedure, the SFO’s ability to achieve many of the
same goals as American prosecutors by using a civil, rather
than a criminal procedure may suggest ways to improve the
American system. At the very least, the British successes
demonstrate an alternative method of achieving corporate
reform and restitution after a finding of corporate misconduct.
154

See supra note 39-55 and accompanying text (discussing R v. Innospec
Ltd., [2010] EW Misc. (EWCC) 7 (Eng.) in which a subsidiary of Innospec Inc. came
under investigation in the United Kingdom after the DOJ began investigating the
parent company for foreign bribery).
155
In assessing whether the corporation has instituted an effective compliance
program, the Guide states that prosecutors at the SFO will examine whether the
corporation has a code of ethics; a statement of anti-corruption culture that is “fully
and visibly supported at the highest levels;” individual accountability for wrongdoing;
training mechanisms; regular checks and auditing in a “proportionate manner” to the
activity being performed; a corporate helpline which enables employees to report
concerns; and “appropriate and consistent disciplinary processes.” SFO GUIDE, supra
note 123, at 7-8. The DOJ states that as long as the corporation’s program is not
merely a “paper program,” it has no “formulaic requirements” for the program. USAM,
supra note 88, § 9-28.800(B). In evaluating a corporation’s compliance system, federal
prosecutors are instructed to evaluate whether the program is “well designed,” “applied
earnestly and in good faith,” and whether the program “work[s].” Id.
156
The SFO does, in some instances, provide advisory opinions in advance of a
transaction, as other regulatory bodies do in the United States and Britain. The SFO has
stated that it will provide guidance in a situation where a corporation is proposing to take
over another corporation, but during its due diligence, discovers evidence of overseas
corruption, and the corporation seeks to understand what remedial measures the SFO
would require if the transaction were to occur. SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 2. There is
no indication that the SFO would provide an advisory opinion in any other circumstance.
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Limiting Adversarial Relationships Between
Corporations and Governments

Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements require the
target corporation to cooperate with the government under
threat of criminal prosecution. Thus, one criticism of these
agreements is that they are inherently coercive and create
adversarial relationships between the government and
corporations operating in the United States.157 In contrast,
Compliance Agreements do not threaten future sanction for a
corporation’s failure to cooperate with the government.
Criminal prosecution can only result if evidence emerges
during the investigation that the “directing mind and will” of
the organization was engaged in unlawful conduct.158 In fact,
the SFO Guide does not describe the course of action that the
SFO would take if the target corporation failed to meet the
terms provided in the Compliance Agreement.
Threat of criminal prosecution for noncompliance with
the terms in a Deferred or Non-Prosecution Agreement may
give corporations greater motivation to comply with the
demands of the government in the United States than in the
United Kingdom. Some have argued that because the
consequences of an indictment are so severe, business
organizations will go to almost any length in order to appease
the prosecutor.159 This means that the government, in turn, can
expect the target corporation to be amenable to virtually every
demand it makes.160 This is especially so because it is the

157

See Peter J. Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: R.I.P.?, 116 YALE
L.J. 312 (Pocket Pt. 2007); see also Baer, supra note 147, at 949.
158
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
159
Indeed, some have argued that an indictment is a “death-sentence” for a
corporation, citing the indictment of Arthur Andersen for its role in the Enron scandal.
See, e.g., Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 165-66. When the government approached
Arthur Andersen with a Deferred Prosecution Agreement, it “refused initially to accept
responsibility for its misconduct and would not agree to major structural reforms.” Id.
at 165. Negotiations finally “collapsed, principally because the company viewed
prosecutors’ demands for cooperation as too onerous.” Id. The company was then
indicted and convicted, which “effectively put the eighty-nine-year old firm out of
business and forced tens of thousands of people to find new jobs.” Id. at 166 (quoting
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron
World, 43 CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2006)).
160
Griffin, supra note 80, at 327. A DOJ official commented, “There’s a right
way and a wrong way to respond when the government comes knocking at your door,”
when comparing Arthur Andersen’s indictment to Merrill Lynch’s settlement
agreement. Id. (quoting John R. Emshwiller & Ann Davis, Merrill Takes Enron
Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at A3).
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prosecutor who ultimately decides whether the entity has
sufficiently met all the terms of the agreement.161
Under this view, British Compliance Agreements,
because they do not threaten criminal indictment, give target
corporations less motivation to cooperate with the government.
However, cases like Balfour Beatty162 and AMEC plc,163 suggest
that regardless of whether or not the threat of criminal
indictment exists, corporations seek to comply with the
government’s demands. Thus, the cooperation of a target entity
need not be predicated upon the threat of future criminal
prosecution. Instead, civil sanctions combined with Compliance
Agreements may achieve the same goals as Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements, while diminishing the adversarial
and coercive relationship between the government and
corporations. British Compliance Agreements have the added
benefit of giving a target entity greater ability to advocate for
terms of an agreement in its favor and to negotiate with the
government to find mutually acceptable remedial measures,
thereby achieving one of the goals of both the DOJ and SFO—
to create agreements that are flexible and individually tailored
for each corporation.164

161

See Griffin, supra note 80 at 320-21. However, some argue that the threat
of criminal prosecution may not be as severe as some once believed. For example, a jury
recently acquitted W.R. Grace, and three of its executives, which had been indicted for
violating the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006), by releasing asbestoscontaminated vermiculite. Bob Van Voris et al., W.R. Grace Acquittal Clears Way for
End to 8-Year Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2009, 12:01 AM) http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6WFdRnfLuNE.
162
See supra Part III.B.
163
In March 2008, AMEC reported to the SFO a finding of irregular payments
which were made when the company was associated in a project in which it was a
shareholder. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, SFO Obtains Civil Recovery Order
against AMEC plc. (Oct. 26, 2009) [hereinafter AMEC Press Release], available at
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2009/sfo-obtainscivil-recovery-order-against-amec-plc.aspx. The SFO determined that the unlawful
conduct amounted to a failure to comply with section 221 of the Companies Act, 1985,
c.40 (U.K). Id. AMEC agreed to pay £4,943,648 in restitution and pledged to improve
their compliance procedure and appoint a monitor to report back to the SFO. Id.
164
Too little adversarialism comes with its own problems, however. Without
some adversarial posture, prosecutors and regulators can become too lenient and can lose
the “healthy dose of skepticism necessary to monitor and discipline” corporate actors.
Baer, supra note 147, at 981 (citing William Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and
Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2003)).
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The Ability of the SFO to Pursue Individual Corporate
Wrongdoers

Another goal of the federal government in entering into
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements is the increased
ability to pursue individual wrongdoers by obtaining additional
information from the target entity.165 However, Deferred and
Non-Prosecution Agreements have come under attack in recent
years for including terms that require corporations to hand
over privileged documents and that force employees to speak
with prosecutors. In fact, because of United States v. Stein and
internal
DOJ
responses
to
perceived
prosecutorial
overreaching, prosecutors are now limited in what they may
demand from corporations during negotiations.166 The DOJ may
no longer compel a corporation to cease payment of promised
attorneys’ fees to employees, and eligibility for cooperation
credit can no longer be given solely based upon the
corporation’s waiver of attorney-client privilege protection.167
The DOJ may not request the disclosure of certain
communications between employees and their attorneys or
corporate counsel, including communications with attorneys
that occurred prior to or at the time of the underlying
conduct,168 and it cannot request any “non-factual or core
attorney work product.”169 The limit in what prosecutors may
now demand from a target corporation illustrates how coercive
the investigations and negotiations can become.
The British procedure demonstrates that prosecutors
may be able to pursue individual wrongdoers without the
threat of criminal indictment. The SFO Guide provides that, in
deciding whether or not to enter into a Compliance Agreement,
prosecutors will evaluate whether the corporation “is prepared
165

Griffin, supra note 80, at 329-32.
See note 82 and accompanying text. However, the limitations on the DOJ
provided in the McNulty Memorandum as a result of United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp.
2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), could be reduced or modified by subsequent memoranda as the
guidelines are not statutorily codified. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
167
USAM, supra note 88, § 9-28.720 to 9-28.730.
168
This is limited to situations only with regard to communications between
attorneys and individuals where the defendant has a “legitimate factual basis to support
the assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense.” USAM, supra note 88, § 9-28.720.
169
“Non-factual or core-attorney work product” is defined, by way of example,
as an attorney’s “mental impressions or legal theories.” Id. The government may still
compel the disclosure of records and witness testimony through subpoenas as it would
in any other criminal investigation, thereby giving prosecutors the ability to obtain
information from the corporation and individuals alike. Id.
166
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to work with [the SFO] on the scope and handling of any
additional investigation [that the SFO] consider[s] to be
necessary,” including taking “appropriate action . . . against
individuals.”170 In the investigation of AMEC for receipt of
irregular payments and failure to comply with reporting
standards in section 221 of the Companies Act,171 the SFO
entered into a Compliance Agreement and obtained a CRO that
required the corporation to make a financial forfeiture, but the
SFO continued to investigate the individuals at AMEC because
of their positions in the company.172 The AMEC case was settled
with respect to the corporation, which provided information
about individual actors during the investigation, but a criminal
investigation continued against individual employees.173 The
SFO requested the relevant facts regarding the employee
misconduct in order for the corporation to meet the terms of the
Compliance Agreement and gain mitigation points. However,
there is no evidence that the SFO required the corporation to
turn over privileged documents, or that employees were forced
to speak with the government in order for the corporation to
meet the terms of the agreement. The AMEC investigation
demonstrates that the threat of criminal prosecution may not
be necessary in order for the government to pursue its goals,
including the goal of securing information about individual
actors. And in fact, the SFO may have more flexibility in
requesting certain documents and interviews because the
investigation into the corporation’s activities is civil, rather
than criminal in nature.
C.

The Benefits of “Light Touch” Monitoring

Another goal of the government in entering into
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements is the ability to
170

SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 3-4. In determining possible criminal
charges against individuals, the SFO will examine to what extent they were involved in
the unlawful activity, what action the entity has taken with respect to them, and
whether the individuals benefitted, and were continuing to benefit financially from the
unlawful conduct. Id.
171
Companies Act, 1989, c.40, § 221(1) (governing accounting records).
172
Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: The 4th ICAC
Symposium (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/
speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “The 4th ICAC Symposium” hyperlink); see also
AMEC Press Release, supra note 163.
173
Alderman, supra note 172. This is dissimilar from the case of Balfour Beatty,
where the SFO concluded that the responsible individuals were no longer employed by
the company and ceased further investigation. See Alderman, supra note 12.
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require corporate wrongdoers to retain a monitor whose
“primary responsibility should be to assess and [to] review a
corporation’s compliance with those terms of the agreement
that are specifically designed to address and [to] reduce the
risk of recurrence of the corporation’s misconduct.”174
In the United States, the imposition of a monitor of the
government’s choosing has been a source of significant criticism
of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements. The first
denunciation of monitors came after United States Attorney
and subsequent governor of New Jersey, Christopher J.
Christie, awarded his former boss, Attorney General John
Ashcroft and his consulting firm, the Ashcroft Group, a multimillion dollar contract to monitor Zimmer Holdings, a medicalsupply company that had come under investigation for paying
kickbacks to doctors.175 As a result, the DOJ distributed the
Morford Memorandum in March 2008, which set forth
guidelines for prosecutors in requiring corporations to hire a
monitor.176 The Morford Memorandum suggests that now,
where a prosecutor requires a target corporation to hire a
monitor, the corporation must be allowed to select the
individual, subject to veto by the prosecutor, or, where a
prosecutor feels that he must play a “greater role” in the

174

Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., on
Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and NonProsecution Agreements with Corporations to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S.
Attorneys 5 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useof
monitorsmemo-03072008.pdf. Despite the insistence by federal prosecutors that target
corporations hire a monitor, some argue that monitors have not been successful in
reducing corporate misconduct nor have they helped shareholders by improving
corporate performance. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 73 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 833-34 (2008) (stating that
the most recent studies find “no significant correlation” between monitors and the
reduction in corporation misconduct (citations omitted)). An extreme example of the
failure of monitors to reduce corporate misconduct came in the case of Bristol-Myers
Squibb. The company was charged by the SEC in 2004 with various accounting frauds
and agreed to appoint a monitor who was given the responsibility of reviewing the
accounting practices of the corporation. Press Release, SEC, Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company Agrees to Pay $150 Million to Settle Fraud Charges (Aug. 4, 2004), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-105.htm; see also Barnard, supra, at 835. Three
years later, despite the fact that the appointed monitor was “a former United States
Attorney and a retired federal judge,” the company was charged with “inflating its drug
prices on bills to for insurers and government agencies” and, later, for entering into “a
secret non-compete agreement [with a competitor].” Barnard, supra, at 835-36 (citing
Sue Reisinger, Doctor’s Orders, CORP. COUNSEL (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/
cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005491068).
175
Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2008, at A1.
176
Morford Memorandum, supra note 174.
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selection of a monitor, he should consider at least three
qualified candidates.177
The SFO noted the intense criticism of monitors in the
United States and instituted a policy of “light touch”
monitoring, whereby a target corporation may nominate a
monitor, subject to veto by the SFO.178 With the use of British
Compliance Agreements, both the method for choosing the
monitor and the responsibilities of the monitor exist
independent from the threat of criminal prosecution. Thus, the
corporation may have a greater ability to negotiate the length
of time that a monitor is required, the person who fills this
seat, and the breadth and scope of the monitor’s review.
D.

Predictability in Required Restitution

The final major goal of the government in entering into
a Deferred or Non-Prosecution Agreement is to secure an
agreement that the target corporation will pay restitution,
often in excess of the actual value of the corporation’s
wrongdoing. Financial restitution under Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements is designed in part to serve the
criminal law goals of general and specific deterrence and
retributivisim; however, the penalties that are now imposed on
corporations by prosecutors are “more a matter of bargaining
before charges are ever filed, and less an analysis of the proper
punishment” of a target corporation’s misconduct.179 This
punishment falls upon innocent shareholders, creditors, and
clients, who ultimately pay the fines.
British Compliance Agreements, however, do not
themselves support payment of a fine by the target corporation.
Rather, the government must obtain a CRO in order to collect
financial restitution.180 These orders are statutorily capped at
the amount equal to the proceeds that the corporation obtained
through unlawful activity plus costs.181 The CRO is also subject
to judicial oversight.182 The statutory cap and the role that
judges play in reviewing the fines sought by the government

177
178
179
180
181
182

Id. at 3-4.
SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 6.
Henning, supra note 157, at 315.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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provide the target entity with some predictability and relative
fairness in the fines levied upon it for its wrongdoing.
In adopting Compliance Agreements that work in
conjunction with civil statutes, the SFO has made some
improvements to the American procedure. The successes of
both the Balfour Beatty and AMEC cases demonstrate that the
threat of criminal indictment may be unnecessary in many
cases to achieve corporate reform and appropriate sanctions.
The SFO has, with the establishment of Compliance
Agreements, attempted to work within the confines of the
substantive laws to strike a compromise between the coercive
nature of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
inadequacy of government regulation that previously existed in
Britain. Further, the substantive corporate criminal laws in
Britain as they presently exist, strike a balance between the
overly expansive application of corporate criminal liability in
the United States and the elimination of corporate criminal
liability altogether.
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the corporate criminal laws and
procedures in the United States and United Kingdom leads to a
larger question of whether a corporation, as an entity, should
be subject to criminal prosecution for the actions of its
employees. Punishing corporations often does not discipline the
entity as a whole, which acts only through individual
employees, but rather harms the people associated with the
corporation whose guilt remains unproven. The substantive
criminal laws in Britain, as they stand, may attain a balance
between the vast potential liability for the entity in the United
States for virtually any misdeed of an employee and the
elimination of corporate liability altogether. British law reflects
the notion that corporations should not be held criminally
liable unless the entity, at its highest level of management,
was responsible for the wrongdoing. This stringent standard
leaves culpability in place for corporations that are, at their
core, mismanaged and severely corrupt,183 while removing the
threat of criminal prosecution for corporations that are
183

A recent example might be American International Group (AIG) and the
dishonest financial practices initiated under Hank Greenberg, AIG’s CEO, particularly
in reference to the extremely risky trading in derivatives by its financial products unit
that subsequently caused its collapse.

2010]

IMPORTATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE

341

managed responsibly, but mistakenly employ errant
employees. While British Compliance Agreements may fall
victim to many of the same criticisms as American Deferred
and Non-Prosecution Agreements, they achieve many of the
same goals of prosecutors in the United States without
producing coercive and adversarial relationships between the
government and target corporations.
With the British importation of American corporate
compliance procedures, the world’s two leading financial
centers are aligning their interests to fight corporate crime.
These developments create a stronger, more intrusive
international corporate compliance regime by incentivizing
corporations, directly or indirectly, to adopt programs designed
to ward off internal misconduct. The result is that most, if not
all, public corporations, regardless of a threat of future
indictment, will establish some internal monitoring processes,
if they have not yet done so. This creates an unprecedented
international system of corporate compliance quasi-regulation.
But, by largely mimicking the procedures of the United States,
the SFO is abandoning an opportunity to develop a better
system than the one that presently exists. This may lead to an
international system of corporate compliance based upon
common, rather than best practices. Policymakers in both the
United States and the United Kingdom should examine these
developments and reevaluate their own procedures accordingly.
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